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THE FISCAL CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: DEFENDERS
BUILDING ALLIANCES WITH FISCAL
CONSERVATIVES
Randolph N. Jonakait and Larry Eger'
The national economic crisis provides a two-edged sword for
public defenders and others concerned with the defense of indigents.
The trend of slashing defender budgets that existed even before the
recent economic downturn can be expected to continue. As Stephanie
McAlister notes, "Indigent defense systems nationwide are
chronically underfunded, forcing individual lawyers to carry
excessive caseloads." 2 Many of these lawyers, operating in crisis
mode, are "forced to provide inadequate defense due to underfunding
and the subsequent excessive caseloads." 3 For example, "the
Missouri State Public Defender system is overworked and
underfunded. The office of the public defender faces a caseload
crisis, caused in part by an ever-increasing number of prosecutions
and a lack of commensurate increases in resources for the system."4
A committee established by the Missouri Senate in 2006 "found that
six years had passed without the public defender's office adding any
staff, yet the system's annual caseload totals rose by 12,000 cases."5
Sean O'Brien asks the following about the Missouri system: "What
does a system on the brink look like? Low salaries cause high
turnover, low morale, and recruitment difficulties. Some defenders
work second jobs to pay student loans. Between 2001 and 2005, the
cumulative turnover rate was nearly 100%.",6
1. Larry Eger is the Public Defender for Florida's 12th Judicial District. Randolph N. Jonakait is a
Professor at New York Law School.
2. Stephanie 1.McAlister, Note, Between South Beach anda HardPlace: The
Underfwnding of the Mianti-Dade Public Defender's Office and the Resulting Ethical Double Standard,
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1323 (2010).

3. Id.
4. Chris Dandurand, Note, Walking Out on the Check: How Missouri Abandoned Its Public
Defenders and Left the Poor to Foot the Bill, 76 Mo. L. REV. 185, 188 (2011).
5. Id.
6. Sean D. O'Brien, Missouri's Public Defender Crisis: Shouldering the Burdens Alone, 75 Mo. L.

1161

1162

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

Minnesota provides another example of a system confronting a
crisis. "As a result of budget cuts and the simultaneous effect of
increased case filings in Minnesota, the public defender workloads
have increased, and the time spent by individual public defenders on
cases has also decreased." 7 Minnesota budget cuts have led to large
layoffs and unfilled vacancies. 8
Examples of budgetary problems for defenders abound. McAlister
cites funding cutbacks in New York City and Kentucky and notes
that "[a]s of November 2008, public defenders' offices in seven
states were refusing to take on new cases or had sued to limit them,
on the grounds that excessive workloads made it impossible to fulfill
their constitutional duties."9 Florida, too, has been affected by limited
funding. "The Sunshine State is not exempt from the growing
nationwide indigent defense crisis. The problem in Florida is similar
to the problems experienced across the country-too little money, too
few attorneys, and too many defendants."' 0
The present economic crisis will only make this situation worse.
What Judge Slieter writes about Minnesota applies to much, if not
all, of the country. "[T]he economic slowdown has affected the
public defense system as drastically as any part of government.""
Public defenders are facing a deepening crisis because of our
governments' financial difficulties.
But these economic problems also present an unusual opportunity
for reforming criminal justice. Some fiscal conservatives are
REV. 853, 866 (2010); see also Dandurand, supra note 4, at 186 ("New attorneys enter the practice with
ever-increasing amounts of law school debt and see little incentive to endure the work load of the public
defender system for any longer than it takes to find another job.").
7. Judge Randall J. Slicter & Elizabeth M. Randa, The Minnesota Public Defender System: A
Change of Governance Should Occur for the State to Effectively Fulfill Its ConstitutionalObligation, 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 599, 610-11 (2011).
8. See William 1. Bernard, Something's Gotta Give: Minnesota Must Revise Its Procedurefor
Determining Eligibility for Appointment of Public Defenders, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 630, 644
(2011) ("These 2008 vacancies equaled fifteen percent of the total number of public defenders
statewide. . . . The Board of Public Defense's anticipated loss of funding from 2009 caused the
elimination of ninety-eight attorney positions or twenty percent of the attorney positions statewide.").
9. McAlister, supra note 2, at 1323.
10. Id. at 1324.
11. Slieter & Randa, supra note 7, at 610; see also Bernard, supra note 8, at 631 ("Given the
necessity to balance the state's budget in these difficult economic times, increasing the funding for the
Board of Public Defense, while desirable, does not appear to be possible.").
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beginning to realize that increased criminalization and lengthier
sentences have led to huge increases in prison budgets without truly
increasing society's safety. Politicians and organizations that may not
have been especially sympathetic to indigent defense in the past are
reconsidering many "tough-on-crime" policies because of the harm
they do to the economy. Concerned about state taxes and economic
health, they are, or should be, concerned about the kinds of criminal
justice reform that defenders can support.
Thus, the financial crisis, while causing problems for defenders,
also provides an opportunity for defenders to help bring about
beneficial changes in criminal justice. Public defenders, with their
firsthand experience, perhaps know better than anyone else aspects of
the criminal justice system that have senselessly driven up state
budgets without increasing public safety. Public defenders should
identify and collect data about these policies and laws and present
this information to the fiscal conservatives. Defenders should seek to
support and expand the conservative reform efforts. And in states
where fiscal conservatives have not been advocating reforms,
defenders need to educate the public on how tough-on-crime policies
are leading to unsustainable budgets. Florida provides an example of
the possibilities.
I. FISCAL CONSERVATIVES AND PRISON BUDGETS

Florida TaxWatch, described by others as a "budget watchdog
group that gets heavy support from business interests,"l 2 identifies
itself as a "private, non-profit, non-partisan research institute [whose]
mission is to provide . . . high quality, independent research and

education on government revenues, expenditures, taxation, public
policies and programs and to increase the productivity and
accountability of Florida government." 3 TaxWatch has now taken
positions on criminal justice that few, if any, fiscally conservative,
12. Repeal ofMandatory Sentences Urged in Florida, GAINESVILLE.COM (Mar. 11, 2011, 1:41 PM),
http://www.gainesvillc.com/article/201 103! I/WIRE/l 10319894.
13. About Florida TaxWatch, FLORIDATAXWATCH, http://www.floridataxwatch.org/aboutus (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011).
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pro-business groups were taking before the economic downturn. It
has suggested a range of changes in Florida's penal laws in order to
reduce incarceration rates. The proposals may be driven solely by the
recognition that spending money on Florida's prisons is not
sustainable for a healthy economy, but defense organizations, which
may see additional reasons for reform, should seek to aid and expand
the conservative recommendations.
In its recent report, A Billion Dollars and Growing: Why Prison
Bonding is Tougher on Florida's Taxpayers Than on Crime, Florida
TaxWatch charts the enormous growth in Florida's prisons.14 "From
1970 to 2010, Florida's prison population increased from nearly
8,800 to 102,000."'s TaxWatch squelches any contention that this
resulted merely from Florida's larger populace. "The state's
population nearly tripled during that period, but that growth cannot
explain the more than eleven-fold increase in the prison
population."' 6 Instead, Florida simply imprisons a greater percentage
of Floridians. "The rate of incarceration . . . has jumped from .13
percent to .54 percent. Forty years ago, the rate of incarceration was
one quarter of what it is today."' 7
TaxWatch also dismisses any argument that a rise in crime
explains the imprisonment surge:
If population growth cannot account for the rapid increase
in the prison population, the incidence of crime does not
explain it either.

. .

. [W]hile the crime rate has fluctuated

over time, there has been a general decline in index crimes
since the late 1980's while the prison population rate has

14. COLLINS CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y & FLORIDA TAXWATCH, A BILLION DOLLARS AND GROWING:
WHY PRISON BONDING IS TOUGHER ON FLORIDA'S TAXPAYERS THAN ON CRIME (2011), available at
http://www.floridataxwatch.org/resources/pdf/0406201 I ABillionDollarsGrowingWhyPrisonBondingTo
ugherFloridasTaxpayersThanCrime.pdf.

15. Id. at4.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 5 (quoting FLORIDA TAX WATCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT
COST SAVINGS TASK FORCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011-12 (2010)).
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increased dramatically.' 8
Instead, TaxWatch maintains that the incarceration rate has soared
because of pandering to the fear of crime.
Florida, like many states, has made a series of purportedly
'tough on crime' policy decisions over the past 20 years
that have driven increases in incarceration . . . brought

about by the public's fear of crime and the corresponding
desire of politicians to pander to those fears for the sake of
not appearing to be "soft on crime."19
As a result, the operating costs of Florida prisons have soared.
TaxWatch reports that from 1980 to 2010, operational spending on
prisons has gone from $169 million (or about $447 million in
inflation-adjusted dollars) to $2.4 billion. 20 And as the report notes,
this amount does not capture the capital expenditures necessary for
the expansion of prison capacity, which puts burdens on future
taxpayers because the construction costs, which until 1993 were
financed from general funds on a pay-as-you-go basis, are now
underwritten through bonds.21 TaxWatch concludes,
Unfortunately for the taxpayers of Florida, by avoiding the
hard but necessary choices required to change the criminal
justice system, our state leaders have added more finance
charges associated with the cost of prison construction on
top of the enormous costs that are already associated with
failing to properly address the problem of prison growth.
Our political leaders are forfeiting our present and

18. Id. at 4 (citing Understanding Florida s UCR Data, FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/685508bc-cc34-4423-b867-827cd0dc6fac/datahistory.aspx
(last visited Feb. I6, 2012)).
19. Id. at 5.
20. COLLINS CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y & FLORIDA TAX WATCH, supra note 14, at 2.

21. Id. at 3.
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future. .22
This business-oriented organization identifies many of the factors
causing Florida's unsustainable situation, which include
the elimination of parole and the adoption of policies
lengthening both sentences and the period of incarceration;
widespread use of very short state prison sentences in lieu
of community-based alternatives (e.g., jail, probation,
treatment, electronic monitoring); and state prison
incarceration for technical probation violations.
Perhaps the most significant factor is the trend toward
minimum,"
"mandatory
or
determinate,
sentencing .... Sentencing laws such as the "85 percent
rule," which mandates that inmates must serve 85 percent
of their sentences before release, and other mandatory
minimum policies ... have combined to balloon the prison
population and keep inmates there longer . . . 23
The incarceration balloon needs deflating, and Florida TaxWatch
finds a useful pin in Texas criminal justice reforms. Texas learned
that its prisons were jammed with convicts who sensibly could have
received alternative, less costly sentences. These include many
imprisoned for drunken driving and drug offenses, "most of whom
are non-violent or first-time offenders; and large numbers of mentally
ill offenders who would be better served in community-based mental
health facilities." 24 Texas expanded non-prison substance abuse,
mental health, and diversion programs and enhanced the frequency of
parole for low-risk prisoners. 25 According to TaxWatch, this
reinvestment strategy increased rehabilitation rates and "resulted in

22. Id. at 14.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 15.
25.

COLLINS CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y & FLORIDA TAXWATCH, supra note 14, at 15.
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an immediate savings of $210.5 million for years 2008 and 2009, and
decreased the state's prison population by 1,257 in 2009.",26
II. DEFENDERS SUPPORTING CONSERVATIVES

At first blush, defenders might find it galling to support
conservative reformers of criminal justice. Defenders have long seen
firsthand the destructive, irresponsible effect of many tough-on-crime
measures enacted by those proclaiming conservative principles. But
what defenders need to remember is that they may have opposed
many of those measures, and they still passed. Legislatures have been
little swayed by defenders showing the senselessness of many of the
last generation's punitive measures. No matter what their motives,
fiscal conservatives are more likely than defenders to get serious
reform considerations from certain legislators, and consequently,
defenders should take a supporting role to such conservatives.
The starting point for reform may be to convince conservatives
that they are still conservative even when supporting proposals to
ameliorate tough-on-crime practices, and those conservatives are
more likely to listen to fiscal conservatives than defenders on this
point. Certainly Florida TaxWatch sees it as important to remove the
liberal tar brush from those seeking to reform criminal justice. Thus,
it desires to have "Florida join the ever-growing . .. range of criminal
justice policy reforms led predominantly by conservatives who
understand that highly punitive and incarceration-heavy penalties
even for minor, non-violent crimes are unsustainable." 27 The
organization goes on to say:
Traditionally, criminal justice reform has been
mischaracterized as reflecting "liberal" political leanings;
however, the voices calling for smarter approaches now
include prominent conservative policy-makers, activists,
and commentators. [Leading c]onservatives . . . have
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2.
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formed a partnership known as Right on Crime to serve as
a clearinghouse for conservatives to lead the way in justice
reform. As the group notes on its website: "Conservatives
are known for being tough on crime, but we must also be
tough on criminal justice spending. That means demanding
more cost-effective approaches that enhance public
safety." 28
Whatever defenders may feel about this conservative conversion,
they should seek to utilize it. If they are in a state where
conservatives have not started to advocate criminal justice reform,
defenders could, of course, directly make the case for reform,
emphasizing the financial impact that tough-on-crime measures have
wrought. Charting a state's increased spending on prisons compared
to spending on things such as education, roads, and police might be
especially eye-catching, and data from states that have reduced
budgets by lowering prison populations could be marshaled. But if
politicians, worried about appearing soft on crime, have not listened
to defenders in the past, they are unlikely to listen to defenders now.
Instead, defenders should identify influential, fiscally conservative
organizations that should be open to a pragmatic appeal for criminal
justice reform, such as chambers of commerce and other business
groups, and provide them with the data and arguments, especially
from conservative groups, as to why it makes fiscal sense to have
reform. Conservative spokespersons are more likely to convince
politicians that, in seeking lower incarceration rates, they are not
taking the electoral risk of appearing soft on crime. Instead, they are
taking the hard-nosed, practical stance of saving tax dollars and
advancing important business and other conservative goals.
Although there are no doubt many things that might be circulated
to get fiscal conservatives thinking about reform, a good starting
point would be to disseminate the 2010 State of the Judiciary
Address by Missouri Chief Justice William Ray Price, Jr.29 In a few
28. Id. at 16.
29. WM. Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice Delivers 2010 State of the Judiciary Address, 66 J. Mo. B. 68
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pages, Chief Justice Price presents compelling, pragmatic reasons for
changing criminal justice. He notes that while his state has enacted
tough-on-crime measures,
[w]hat we did not do was check to see how much it costs,
or whether we were winning or losing. In fact, it has cost us
billions of dollars and we have just as much crime now as
we did when we started.... We may have been tough on
crime, but we have not been smart on crime.30
He especially advocates changes towards nonviolent offenders,
who have been increasingly incarcerated at great costs with little gain
for public safety. 3 ' He stresses that this is not merely a Missouri
problem and that it should not be a partisan issue. Quoting leaders
from around the country, Price concludes, "Republicans and
Democrats across the country are waking up." 32
Chief Justice Price does make some general reform
recommendations, but defenders could present to conservatives a
more detailed list of possibilities that are accompanied with the fiscal
impact of possible reforms. The recent detailed proposals of Florida
TaxWatch could be used. While some of those proposals are Floridacentric, the thirty pages of reform suggestions in Report and
Recommendations of the Florida TaxWatch Government Cost
Savings for Fiscal Year 2011-12 offers many concrete measures that
should apply generally.33 Perhaps most important for convincing
fiscal conservatives of the benefits of reform, the report frequently
cites successful efforts in other states with the savings that actually
resulted, and it gives realistic, projected budget decreases if such
reforms were instituted in Florida.

(2010).
30. Id. at 69.
31. I/.at 70.
32. Id.
33. FLORIDA
GOVERNMENT

TAXWATCH,

REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COST SAVINGS TASK FORCE

FOR FISCAL

OF

THE

FLORIDA

YEAR 2011-12 (2010),

http://www.floridataxwatch.org/resources/pdf/12082010GCTSF.pdf

TAXWATCH

available at
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III. CONSERVATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCING THE PRISON
POPULATION

TaxWatch finds essential the creation of a non-partisan
commission to do a thorough review of a state's criminal justice and
corrections systems. This body should have representation from all
branches of government and draw on expertise from many fields
including "criminology, sentencing, corrections,. veterans affairs,
mental health, substance abuse, reentry and community
supervision." 34 TaxWatch notes, "Virtually every state that has made
the substantive policy changes that have succeeded in reducing the
size of their corrections population has accomplished this through a
bipartisan deliberative body engaging all three branches of
government." 3 5
TaxWatch also indicates that fiscal conservatives must change the
last generation's predominant philosophy that the primary purpose of
sentencing is punishment. Florida has been "consistent with the trend
across the U.S. that began in the late seventies with determinate
sentencing, focusing on punishment (called 'just deserts'), deterrence
and incapacitation." 36 Sentencing then centers on the offenses, prior
criminal history, and injury to the victim, but does not address public
safety with a concern for recidivism. Instead, fiscal sense requires
policies that increase public safety with the least cost. "[P]olicies and
practices that address risk at the time of sentencing so that the
sentence is most appropriate to the individual defendant's risk of
recidivating" must be used.3 7 Punishment for punishment's sake has
cost the taxpayers much and has not made society notably safer;
reducing the rate at which convicted offenders commit future crimes
not only can be cheaper, but also increases public safety.
Specific reforms start with the recognition that the vast majority of
the imprisoned have been sentenced for nonviolent offenses.
TaxWatch reports that in fiscal year 2008-2009, "only 28.2 percent
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
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of the new admissions to prisons were incarcerated for violent
crimes; the rest were admitted for drug, property or 'other'
offenses."38 This trend is not limited to Florida. For example,
Missouri Chief Justice Price notes that the number of nonviolent
offenders in Missouri prisons has almost doubled since 1994" and
that the rise in the number of imprisoned nonviolent offenders
explains much of the increase in corrections budgets. Chief Justice
Price concludes that his state is now "spending $233.4 million a year
to incarcerate nonviolent offenders .. . not counting the investment in
the 10 prisons it takes to hold these individuals at $100 million per
prison. In 1994, appropriations to the Department of Corrections
totaled $216,753,472. Today, it's $670,079,452.",40 And fiscal
conservatives should see that this has not been money well spent.
Chief Justice Price reports that "the recidivism rate for these
individuals, who are returned to prison within just two years, is 41.6
percent." 4 1 If a safer society is the goal, the increased corrections
budget contains enormous government waste.
TaxWatch suggests many possible reforms to reduce the
incarceration rate of the nonviolent, including more non-state prison
sentences, increasing the weights necessary for felony possession of
marijuana and cocaine, updating the value thresholds for property
felonies, and expanding the use of electronic monitoring. The report
supports these reforms by projecting savings. For example, Florida
prisons have 2,260 inmates incarcerated for mere possession of
marijuana or cocaine, one-third of whom are first-time offenders.4 2
"If half of the first-time offenders were diverted from prison, the state
could save approximately $6.7 million, annually."4 3 A study has
shown that electronic monitoring reduces the likelihood of
recidivism. If such monitoring was used for the last 20% of half the
prisoners' sentences, the state could save $5.7 million.4 4
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 50.
Price, supra note 29, at 70.
Id.
Id.
TaxWatch, supra note 33, at 54.
Id.
Id. at 56.
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Better drug treatment can reduce incarceration and recidivism, the
TaxWatch report notes. About 60% of all Florida arrests are either
committed under the influence of drugs or alcohol or in pursuit of
drugs or alcohol. 45 Florida has in-prison drug programs, but they do
not serve all those who should be treated. "Significant savings could
be achieved if certain offenders were allowed to receive treatment
outside of the confines of prison during the last portion of their prison
sentence, and research shows that programs in the community
produce twice the impact on recidivism as the same program behind
the walls."4 6
Florida has abolished parole and requires prisoners to serve at least
85% of their sentences.4 7 Even relatively minor changes in this
requirement can bring great savings. If nonviolent inmates were
released after serving 80% of their sentences, more than $13 million
could be saved annually.4 8
With increased sentence lengths and the abolition of parole has
come an aging prison population. Although "the literature shows that
most offenders age out of their crime-committing years," nationally
10% of the prison population is over forty-nine. 49 It is even higher in
Florida, and the rate is increasing. It was 5.7% in 1996, 8.0% in
2000, and 16. 1%in 2010.50 The costs of incarcerating the elderly are
estimated to be three times that of incarcerating younger prisoners,
primarily because of increased medical costs.5 1 If elderly prisoners
not convicted of capital murder were paroled after serving twenty
years, Florida could save $2.6 million a year. 52
Fiscal conservatives, as indicated by TaxWatch, also have realized
that more than a reduction in the incarceration rate is needed.
Inmates, no matter the length of their sentences, must be better
prepared for a post-prison life. Investment in programs that cut
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id at 34.
TaxWatch, supra note 33, at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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recidivism not only pays for itself by reducing future imprisonments,
but it also contributes to a safer society. In spite of attempts at
reducing Florida recidivism, "about one-third of inmates nevertheless
do come back within three years of release. Florida has not focused
sufficient resources in preparing them during their previous stints in
prison to succeed upon being released."5 3 Among other things,
TaxWatch advocates expansion of substance abuse and mental health
treatment, as well as literacy, education, vocational, and lifemanagement training. Ultimately, "[g]ainful employment is essential
to any strategy to reduce recidivism, and thus to reduce crime and
make communities safer." 54 Florida, however, like other states, has
enacted "a vast, bewildering and unwieldy patchwork of hundreds of
state-created restrictions" on the employment of convicts.5 5 "For
employers, it's a minefield. Hiring in violation of the restrictions can
lead to a loss of a business license and other harsh penalties." 56 The
state needs a thorough review and reform of these restrictions in
order to reduce recidivism.
IV.

THE REFORM ROLES FOR DEFENDERS

In states where fiscal watchdogs have not begun a fundamental
rethinking of the criminal justice system, defenders should be trying
to convince conservative leaders and organizations that rising prison
costs are unsustainable and can be safely reduced through the kinds
of reforms Florida TaxWatch proposes. In states where fiscal
conservatives have already begun to advocate for change, the role of
the defenders should be different. Although defenders might be
sorely tempted to point out that many conservatives in the past took
tough-on-crime positions without any cost-benefit analyses, helping
to cause the present crisis, pragmatism dictates resisting this
temptation. If conservatives are advocating reform, no matter what
their reasons and their past positions, defenders should now aid them,
53.
54.
55.
56.

TaxWatch, supra note 33, at 63.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 67.
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and the alliance will not be helped by dredging up previous,
inconsistent positions. The political realities are that these fiscal
conservatives are more likely to be effective in reforming the system
than defenders, and consequently defenders should be content to
place themselves in a supporting role on the issues that those
conservatives have identified.
Defenders, however, should take additional steps. Their everyday
experience with those affected by the tough-on-crime policies gives
defenders extensive expertise concerning the waste and costliness of
many penal laws and practices that those outside the criminal justice
system are unlikely to have. Defenders should be identifying
additional reforms that could attract fiscal conservatives, marshaling
data about them, and presenting this information to the conservatives
spearheading reform efforts. For example, in Florida incarceration
rates could be sensibly decreased if convictions for nonviolent
second-degree felonies, such as dealing in stolen property or the sale
of small amounts of drugs, did not require state prison sentences; if
possession of burglary tools was made a misdemeanor; and if the
opiate trafficking statutes were based on the actual weight of the
drugs and not mixtures containing them.
V. THE REEXAMINATION OF PENALTIES FOR SOME SPECIFIC CRIMES
Defenders have also seen that the last generation's tough-on-crime
policies have wastefully increased penalties and conditions for some
specific crimes. This has often been the result when the impetus for
legislative action has been some well-publicized, violent incident.
The resulting legislation often goes well beyond the triggering crime
and applies to many nonviolent offenders who pose no real
continuing threat to community safety. Such laws may not
meaningfully increase societal security, may make recidivism more
likely, and usually are enacted with little consideration of costs.
Fiscal conservatives should be concerned about such laws.

2012]1
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A. Sex Offender Registration and Related Laws
Prime examples are the special conditions imposed on sexual
offenders after the completion of sentences. All states require
convicted sex offenders to register home addresses with local
officials, often for a lifetime. All the states require community
notification of such registrations. Many communities and states place
restrictions on where the convicted sex offenders can live or work.57
Such laws have often been passed in a misleading way. A study of
the debates leading to federal laws concerning sexual offenders
indicates the pattern. Supporters cited horrific, well-publicized
examples of crimes committed on children and maintained that the
laws were necessary for protection against similar acts, but the laws
were not limited to those who have victimized children. 58
The registration, notification, and residence requirements do little
to affect public safety because they are based on the myth that
children primarily have to be protected from strangers. The rationale
is that if we can keep tabs on those strangers and limit their access to
where children congregate, safety will be significantly improved. The
primary danger, however, does not come on the streets or at bus stops
or in schools, but from within the home. "The vast majority of child
molestation offenses are committed by non-strangers. Offenses by
strangers account for only seven percent of all cases of child sex
abuse." 59 Even so, the study of the federal debates found no supporter
57. See Amber Leigh Bagley, "An Era of Human Zoning": Banishing Sex Offenders from
Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J. 1347, 1348-49 (2008) ("[A]ll
fifty states and the District of Columbia require convicted sex offenders to register their home addresses
with local officials. Some offenders must register for a number of years, others for the duration of their
lives. All fifty states have also enacted legislation requiring community notification of a sex offender's
presence. ... [S]ome states and cities have gone even further, requiring sex offenders to reside outside
restricted zones.... [T]hc most recent zoning restrictions reach residential and employment
options. .. ."); see also Meredith Cohen, Notes and Comments, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to
Combat Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 717, 741 (2008)
("Approximately 400 municipalities across the country have enacted local zoning ordinances restricting
where sex offenders can live.").
58. See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Casefor Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76
IND. L.J. 315, 355 (2001) ("[The] debates framed Megan's Law almost entirely in terms of child
protection. This was expected given the name of the bill, but it did not accurately reflect the true scope
of Megan's Law [which was not] limited only to offenders who victimize children. Legislators' decision
to frame the debate in such limited terms must, therefore, be seen as a conscious rhetorical tactic.").
59. Carissa Byrne Hessick, DisentanglingChild Pornographyfrom Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U.
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making a distinction between familial and non-familial abuse, 60 and
the laws do little to affect the rate of abuse by family members and
acquaintances.
The laws are overbroad even for addressing the "stranger danger."
The registration, notification, and residency laws are not limited to
rapists and child molesters. They often include flashers, voyeurs,
prostitutes, possessors of child pornography, those in adult incest
relationships, and those who have committed bestiality. 6 1 The person
who urinates in an alleyway may be convicted of public indecency,
and this can make him a sexual offender and subjected to registration
and residency restrictions. 62 Twenty-nine states require registration as
sex offenders for those engaging in consensual teenage sex. 63 The
laws often treat the included sex offenders as a homogeneous group
when they actually present greatly differing public dangers and
risks. 64 The eighteen-year-old convicted of having consensual sexual
L. REV. 853, 887 (2011); see also Bagley, supra note 45, at 1378 ("[Tlhe most likely sexual threat to a
child is an adult that the child knows well: in ninety percent of child molestation cases, the offender is
either a family member or acquaintance of the child."); cf Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging
Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 435, 453 (2010) ("Perhaps the most
prominent myth concerning sex offenders is the concept of 'stranger danger."').
60. See Filler, supra note 54, at 332 ("Every congressional story told in support of Megan's Law
featured a child victim who suffered serious abuse. Legislators did not tell any stories involving
arguably less disturbing offenses like consensual sex with minors or possession of child pornography,
both of which fell within the ambit of Megan's Law. More importantly, legislators eschewed accounts
featuring adult victims. They focused only on vivid, dramatic, and undeniable cases of child
victimization."); see also id. at 338 ("Not a single Megan's Law supporter [in the federal debates] cited
data that distinguished familial and nonfamilial abuse."); Michael Vitcllo, Punishing Sex Offenders:
When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 667 (2008) ("[A]bductions and murders[ that]
command the public's attention, . . . although statistical aberrations, have driven America's policies for
dealing with sexual offenders for over a decade.").
61. See Yung, supra note 55, at 455 (observing that, while rapists, child molesters, and child
pornographers have to register, "many other crimes arc substantially represented on sex offender
registries, including flashers, gropers, voyeurs, prostitutes, persons who have engaged in adult incest
relationships, stalkers, and those who have committed bestiality").
62. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 53, at 1388 ("[S]ex offender registration laws have [led] to the
regulation of people who are not particularly frightening, such as people convicted of indecent exposure
for urinating in public."); see also Yung, supra note 55, at 456 ("In many states, public urination is
prosecuted as public indecency, meaning that those persons so convicted are categorized with
flashers.").
63. Cohen, supra note 53, at 738 ("Currently, at least twenty-nine states require individuals to
register as sex offenders for engaging in consensual teenage sex.").
64. Yung, supra note 58, at 455 ("Sex offenders are treated as a uniform population even though
they are an incredibly diverse group representing different dangers and risk levels."); see also Vitello,
supra note 59, at 676 ("[L]egislatures have created broad statutory protections based on an incorrect
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intercourse with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend surely poses a
different societal risk from the child rapist and even the one-time
flasher, but all may face the same registration and residency
restriction requirements. "There are many persons who are branded
sex offenders who have committed crimes that cannot possibly
justify the punishments and restrictions to which they are
subjected."6 5
No public safety gain has been shown from the registration,
notification, and zoning requirements. Studies have found that
registration laws have "reduced neither the number of re-arrests for
sex offenses nor the proportion of child molestation or incest as
compared to other sex offenses. Nor [have the laws] reduced the
number of victims." 66 This is not surprising since the laws are aimed
at strangers.
[E]ven if policies aimed at stranger offenses were
successful, because strangers make up such a small
percentage of child sex offenses, reducing the rate of
contact offenses by strangers is likely to have a smaller
effect on the overall number of child sex abuse crimes than
a measure aimed at intrafamily or other non-stranger
offenders.6 7
On the other hand, these additional, often lifelong consequences to
sex offense convictions may make it less likely that family and

view of sexual offenders as a homogencous group.").
65. Yung, supra note 55, at 476; see also Vitello, supra note 56, at 670-71 ("[Registration is
required for] a variety of crimes where the conduct falls far short of the predatory conduct that gave rise
to the registration requirements. For example, included are crimes like sexual battery, a variety of
offenses dealing with underage sexual partners even if the conduct is factually consensual, and
possession of child pornography, all of which present risks far different from those giving rise to the
registration laws.").
66. Hessick, supra note 55, at 889; see also Cohen, supra note 53, at 740 (no convincing evidence of
public safety gains from registration and notification laws).
67. Hessick, supra note 55, at 889-90; see also Bagley, supra note 53, at 1377 ("Zoning restrictions
fail to protect children from sexual threats . . . [because] these restrictions focus on strangers who have
been convicted of sex offenses, but strangers are the least likely individuals to sexually assault
children.").
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juvenile offenders are reported. 68 After New Jersey imposed
community notification requirements, it had a decrease in incest
reports.69 The notifications, besides placing a permanent burden on
the offender, can often, in effect, tell the community that the
offender's child or stepchild was the victim, and many victims and
their parents may wish to keep that information private.7 0
While adding little to public safety, the registration, notification,
and residency restrictions can greatly burden the offenders. They
make it harder to get jobs and education. They make it difficult to
find housing, and offenders may have to move out of their
communities, causing increased homelessness. 7 1 What Professor
Corey Rayburn Yung says about one offense applies to many:
A person convicted of a single count of public indecency
might be subject to a lifetime of extensive registration
requirements that carry hefty prison terms for a single
violation. The information required in the registry,
including the offender's residential address, email address,
and phone number, will be listed on a publicly available
database for anyone to view. The convict might be subject
to residency restrictions such that he or she can no longer
live in large portions of the state in which he or she resides.
This can result in physical separation from family
(including a spouse) and the only friends that the offender

68. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 53, at 1379 ("[T]hc threat of these restrictions is likely to decrease
the reports of sexual assault by children's primary threat-family members and friends."); see also
Vitello, supra note 56, at 685 ("Even if they report the crime, they may lose the will to cooperate with
the police when they discover the severity of punishment that their family member may face. While
family members may favor some state intervention, bringing the full force of current sexual offender
statutes to bear may lead the family to lose their nerve.").
69. See Bagley, supra note 53, at 1384 ("This close association between offender and victim has led
to decreased reporting of abuse within families.").
70. Id. ("Incest victims fear reporting incest because the combination of registration and notification
exposes the victim-who shares the offender's home-to the effects of the regulation.").
71. See Bagley, supra note 53, at 1361 ("Homelessness is a likely result of being cast out of the
community where one lives and works. For a less-skilled individual, or for an individual with highly
specialized skills, finding employment within his new community may take time."); see also Vitello,
supra note 56, at 681 (noting that reporting and residency requirements can cause homelessness).
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might have ever known. 72
The laws make it harder for the offender who has completed a
sentence to integrate back into the community, and that lack of
integration may actually increase recidivism.7 3 The laws may be
actually making society less safe.
Like many tough-on-crime measures, the registration, notification,
and residency restriction laws have been passed without
consideration of their monetary costs. 74 Defenders, however, need to
stress to fiscal conservatives that the laws, while accomplishing little
positively, affect public budgets. Every time law enforcement
officers check a registrant's address, money, in effect, is being
spent. 75 The registration laws have caused the hiring of extra law
enforcement agents. 76 Perhaps the strongest indication of the
significant costs comes as a result of a federal law that seeks to have
states impose registration and other requirements on sexual
offenders. "The penalty for noncompliance for any fiscal year is that
a state will lose 10% of funds authorized under the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act . . .. Interestingly, every state that has

studied the costs of compliance has determined that noncompliance is
substantially cheaper."77

72. Yung, supra note 55, at 473.
73. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 53, at 1381 (noting that, because recidivism is lowered when an
offender can make a successful transition into the community, "ironically, one of the major results of the
zoning schemes may be an increased rate of recidivism for sex offenders. ... By making community
living difficult for sex offenders, zoning schemes deny registered sex offenders the opportunity to
successfully reenter society and lead productive lives").
74. See Filler, supra note 54, at 361 (observing that legislators eschewed "the dull, nuts-and-bolts
issues, and [avoided] complicated [issues] relating to the efficiency and costs of Megan's Law"); see
also id. at 363 (noting that supporters "did not address the potentially significant economic costs of the
bill").
75. See Bagley, supra note 53, at I388-89 ("[O]verinclusive registration laws waste police officers'
time. For every hour an officer spends checking a flasher's address to ensure he lives there, that officer
is not checking on pedophiles, rapists, and other sexual predators.").
76. See Yung, supra note 55, at 447 ("A recent appropriations bill allocated funds to hire 150 deputy
U.S. Marshals who will be solely dedicated to enforcing the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act. . . .").
77. Yung, supra note 55, at 479.
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B. Child PornographyLaws
The last generation's tough-on-crime stance has also driven up
corrections budgets by its reaction to child pornography. As Carissa
Byrne Hessick notes in a recent, excellent article, "The legislative
response to the modern increase in child pornography has been
uniformly draconian. State and federal governments have drastically
increased the criminal penalties for possession of child
pornography." 78 Since 2000, a majority of the states have raised the
sentences for the crime. Some have made the maximums twenty
times longer than before or even authorized life imprisonment.7 9
Sentences can be extremely lengthy when each image possessed,
usually amassed from the Internet with little effort, is treated as a
80
separate count that results in consecutive sentences. Many places
punish mere possession as harshly as the production, manufacture, or
distribution of the pornography,8 ' and courts have imposed longer
sentences for those convicted of possession of pornography than on
those convicted of molesting and sexually assaulting children. 82
If the true goal of criminal justice is the fiscally conservative one
of increased public safety, then the draconian penalties for possession
of child pornography should correlate to a decrease in child abuse.
After reviewing the data, however, Hessick concludes that there is a
"lack of empirical support for a link between possession of child
pornography and child sex abuse." 83 This is hardly surprising, once
again, because the rationale for the harsh sentences sees child abuse
coming from strangers, when that is seldom the case. In fact, the
lengthy sentences do little, if anything, to make our children safer,
but they do add to corrections budgets, and defenders should be
presenting these facts to fiscal conservatives.

78. Hessick, supra note 55, at 855.
79. See id. at 860.
80. See id. at 861-62 ("Treating each image as a separate offense can result in extremely long
sentences, especially because the Internet allows individuals to amass a significant number of images
with little effort.").
81. See id. at 864.
82. See id. at 863.
83. Id. at 900.
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. VI. REDUCING PRETRIAL INCARCERATION

Groups such as Florida TaxWatch have focused on state
corrections budgets, and the resulting reform proposals center on the
treatment of felony convictions. Pretrial incarcerations, however, also
cost taxpayers, and defenders should seek to educate fiscal
conservatives about those public expenditures and suggest reforms
that could reduce them. Needless financial burdens are placed on
taxpayers by detaining those who are not a danger and who would
appear for court dates if released. Investment in correctly identifying
such defendants can save the system money. Appointing lawyers
earlier in the process than is now done in many places can be a costeffective way to reduce the number of needless detentions.
Douglas I. Colbert notes, "In most state and local courts, legal
representation of the poor does not commence at the crucial bail
stage." 84 Usually these initial judicial pretrial release hearings "are
perfunctory":
They move swiftly, aided by video jail broadcasts, which
make it unnecessary even to transport arrestees to the local
courtroom. In many jurisdictions, a prosecuting attorney is
present and recommends bail, thus stacking the odds even
more against an accused. Under these circumstances, many
defendants choose to remain silent .

. .

. [T]he outcome is

typically adverse: absent an advocate to provide verified
information about an accused's reliable ties to the
community, most judges maintain or set bail conditions
beyond what the individual can afford.
Concerned about this situation, Colbert and others set up a pilot
program in Baltimore. Legal representatives were randomly assigned
before the first judicial bail hearing to a portion of the pool of those

84. Douglas 1. Colbert ct al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the
Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2002).

85. Id. at 1726-27.
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arrested for nonviolent crimes. The initial bail set by a bail
commissioner was nearly identical for the represented and
nonrepresented groups, but at the judicial review of that bail,
represented defendants were more than four times as likely to have
their bail reduced than were the nonrepresented, and the represented
were significantly more likely to be released on their own
recognizance. 86 More of the represented group gained release from
pretrial detention and gained release more quickly than those who
were not represented. These outcomes were not the results of
lawyerly tricks, obfuscations, or obstruction; instead, lawyers made
sure that the court had more complete, relevant knowledge for the
bail decision. The lawyer acted as an
information provider to the court. A lawyer would be
expected to investigate the suspect's circumstances and
prior history and provide information to the court about
their community ties, financial hardships, and prior
experiences with arrests, convictions, and court
appearances. An attorney would, therefore, have the
requisite knowledge to correct any mistaken data about the
suspect or her case that the court might receive from other
sources (for example, from the prosecutor or pretrial
services). 87
While defenders may see many advantages for effective
representation by the appointment of counsel as early as possible,
defenders should be emphasizing that appointment before the first
judicial bail hearing can reduce the overall costs of criminal justice.
86. Id. at 1753, 1755.
87. Id. at 1743-44.
88. See id. at 1727 ("[Dlcnying counsel to an accused indigent during the crucial period following
arrest has disastrous consequences on the legal system's ability to render fair and just verdicts. This is
the period lawyers recognize as 'most critical' for conducting a 'thoroughgoing investigation' and
evaluation of the State's evidence. Delaying a lawyer's immediate entry often translates into prosecuting
witnesses becoming unavailable or unwilling to speak to defense counsel and severely impedes the
preparation of a meaningful defense. By the time counsel enters the ongoing proceeding, too much
valuable time has been lost. The typical detainee is left with little hope of receiving adequate and
effective legal assistance.").
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The authors of the Baltimore study concluded that "for every person
given a lawyer at the bail hearing, we expect to save about 10 bed
days overall" of pretrial detention.89 Since about 90% of the cases
entering the criminal justice system are for nonviolent, low-level
offenses, reducing needless pretrial detentions by only a week on
average can produce significant cumulative savings. In jurisdictions
where defenders are not appointed until after the initial judicial bail
review, the defenders should be making the case to conservatives for
pilot programs for the earlier appointment of counsel so that the
increased costs for attorneys can be measured against the savings that
result from any lesser pretrial detention that results.
VII. EXAMINING

PROMISED SAVINGS FROM ADOPTED REFORMS

Defenders should also be urging fiscal conservatives to analyze
whether some instituted criminal justice innovations have delivered
the promised savings. In one such reform, instead of bringing
detainees to court for an initial bail decision, the detainees appear
before a camera and a microphone in the jail with the image and
sound piped into the courtroom where the bail decision is made. Such
videoconferencing, which promises reduced costs, has been widely
adopted. 90 "[T]heir adoption is fueled by the attractions of
convenience and the reduction of transportation and other costs
associated with live proceedings." 9 1 The assumption is that a video
system brings efficiencies without disadvantaging detainees.92
A major study, however, casts doubt upon those rationales for
videoconferencing. That study examined the use of videos for bail
decisions in Cook County, Illinois. 93 While Cook County maintained

89. Id. at 1757.
90. Shari Seidman Diamond ct al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings
on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 869, 878 (2010). By 2002, the majority of the states
allowed some types of criminal proceedings to be held by videoconferencing. Id.
91. Id. at 877. In addition, "[v]ideoconferenced hearings also have the benefit of reducing safety
concerns when prisoners or potentially volatile mentally disturbed individuals are involved, because
transporting those individuals to court for a live hearing may pose a security risk." Id.
92. See id. at 869.
93. Id. at 870.
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live bail decisions for murder, manslaughter, and sexual assault
cases, it instituted a video system for the initial bail determination for
all other felonies. The study examined the bail hearings for a period
of more than eight years preceding the institution of the
videoconferencing and eight years afterwards. The study found that
the video hearings had led to an increase in the size of the bail. The
average bond amount set in the televised proceedings was 51%
higher compared to when the bail hearings were live, while the bond
for the felonies that continued to get a live hearing increased an
insignificant 13% during the same time period. 94
Those who conducted the study cannot definitively say why
videoconferencing made bail decisions more severe, but they note
that other studies have indicated that "there may be some aspects of
live presence that affect the believability of an individual."9 5 They go
on to state:
If there is something about the presence of a live individual
that cannot be replicated even with modem technology,
then videoconferenced bail hearings cannot avoid a
sacrifice of information that may threaten the quality of bail
decisions, and a dehumanization that encourages a harsher
response than would occur if the judge were faced with a
live individual.9 6
The point to stress to fiscal conservatives, however, is that a
program to save money may be actually increasing the burden on
taxpayers. Increased bails mean more people detained, and that
means higher costs. The study makes this important point:
Ironically, an overeager welcome of technology can impose
costs of its own. By boosting bond levels and decreasing
the ability of defendants to obtain release pending trial,

94. See id. at 892-96.
95. Id. at 900.
96. Diamond ct al., supra note 84, at 900.
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videoconferenced bail hearings may actually impose
financial costs on the justice system by leading to pretrial
incarcerations of defendants who would be otherwise
released.
This does not mean that innovations that could lead to cost savings
without disadvantaging defendants should not be sought. On the
other hand, no matter how compelling the logic might seem for a
change, a criminal justice system should not simply leap into a
wholesale change. As with the videoconferencing, there might be
unforeseen, costly consequences. "The needed approach is to conduct
pilot programs that include an evaluation of the operation and impact
of proposed reforms, rather than simply to impose dramatic systemwide changes, as Cook County did with the videoconferencing bail
'reform."' 98
VIII. SAVINGS FROM FRONTLOADING THE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM

Defenders should also point out to fiscal conservatives how
shifting resources for the earlier adjudication of minor offenses can
save the criminal justice system money. In many jurisdictions, after
bail is set, the case is adjourned for ten days to a month or even fortyfive days. 99 At this next court appearance, however, many of those
who have been in pretrial incarceration are released from custody for
a number of reasons. Often the cases are' not prosecuted. In
Baltimore, for example, "[m]ore than two out of three District Court
00
cases are ultimately dismissed or placed on the inactive calendar."
In addition, as many defenders know, a significant number of lowlevel offenders plead guilty at their first appearance after the bail
setting and are placed on probation or put into diversion programs or
receive some other sort of disposition that releases those detained.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id at 901.
Id. at 902.
See Colbert et al., supra note 79, at 1722, 1727.
Id. at 1721-22.
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As a result, many jailed for low-level offenses gain release from
pretrial incarceration at their first appearance after the bail-setting.
Jurisdictions that postpone all low-level cases for two or three weeks
or more after the initial bail hearing are wasting money. If instead,
the next court appearance for at least the detained defendants were
held sooner, the pretrial incarceration rate, along with its costs, would
decrease. If fiscal conservatives are seeking to cut the needless costs
in criminal justice, the focus should not just be on the needlessly
lengthy incarcerations of those charged with serious felonies. In
addition, the criminal justice community should focus on the front
end of the process, where most defendants face minor charges:
Immediate decisions would be made to dismiss, to refrain
from prosecution, or to offer diversion after arrest. At a
time when many jurisdictions are seeing an increase in
misdemeanor arrests because of "no tolerance police
practices" and an increase in local pretrial jail populations,
[more resources earlier in the process can reduce] the costs
1o1
of overburdened jail and court systems .
IX. REEXAMINE THE DEATH PENALTY
Defenders should also be supplying fiscal conservatives with
reasons for a reexamination of the death penalty. When a lifewithout-parole sentence is the alternative, the death penalty, of
course, does nothing to enhance general public safety through
reducing recidivism. Only if the death penalty acts as a deterrent to
others can it make society safer. Support, however, for its deterrent
effect is weak and contradictory. In an excellent review of the data,
John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers note that homicide rates in states
with and without the death penalty tend to rise and fall together, and
this has been true even when U.S. Supreme Court decisions imposed
102Thsdt
This data
a moratorium everywhere on capital punishment.
101. Id. at 1721.
102. John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Use and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty
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indicates that any possible effect the death penalty has on murder is
small because "most of the variation in homicide rates is driven by
are common to both death penalty and non-death penalty
factors that
03
states."
While any possible deterrent effect of the death penalty must be
minor, it is almost impossible to find because it is "difficult .

.

. to

isolate any causal effects with confidence."'0 Indeed, while some
data suggests a deterrent effect, that data simultaneously suggests that
the death penalty could actually be associated with an increase in
homicide rates. 0 5 The authors reviewing the data conclude
that the existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly
fragile . . . . Our estimates suggest not just "reasonable
doubt" about whether there is any deterrent effect of the
death penalty, but profound uncertainty. We are confident
that the effects are not large, but we remain unsure even of
whether they are positive or negative.106
Donohue and Wolfers are hardly alone in this assessment. The
Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) commissioned a survey of
police.chiefs, and even a majority of this group did not believe that
the death penalty reduced homicides.10 7 The DPIC goes on to. state:
A recent survey showed that 88% of the country's top
criminologists do not believe the death penalty acts as a
deterrent to homicide . . . . Over many years, deterrence

studies

have been

inconclusive,

with most experts

Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 800-01 (2005).
103. Id. at 801.
104. Id. at 806-07.
105. See id. at 835 ("[Data] suggested that the true 95% confidence interval runs from cach execution
causing 23 homicides to each preventing 54 homicides.").
106. Id. at 794; see also id. at 843 ("The only clear conclusion is that the execution policy drives little
of the year-to-year variation in homicide rates. As to whether executions raise or lower the homicide
rate, we remain profoundly uncertain.").
107. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SMART ON CRIME: RECONSIDERING THE
available at
12
(2009),
OF
ECONOMIC
CRISIS
IN A
TIME
DEATH
PENALTY
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf.
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concluding that the relative rarity of executions and their
concentrations in a few states renders national conclusions
about a deterrent effect to the death penalty unreliable.' 08
Defenders should stress to fiscal conservatives that empirical
evidence does not support the proposition that the death penalty
enhances public safety. And, of course, fiscal conservatives should be
able to recognize that the death penalty imposes a major burden on
taxpayers.
There is no one accepted method to determine death penalty costs,
which will vary depending upon local pay scales and other factors,
but it is clear that those costs are high. "Researchers have employed
different approaches, using different assumptions. However, all of
the studies conclude that the death penalty system is far more
expensive than an alternative system in which the maximum sentence
is life in prison."' 09
The DPIC concludes, however, that the true cost for the death
penalty must not be calculated for a case where an execution occurs,
but for the total of all death penalty cases. DPIC notes that a state
may spend $1 million more for a death penalty trial than for a nondeath proceeding for the same crime. However, if only one in three of
these trials results in a death sentence, the one death sentence resulted
from $3 million of excess litigation costs. And if only one in ten
sentenced to death is actually executed, each execution results from
$30 million in excess costs.'" 0
A fiscally conservative response might contend that death penalty
costs can be reduced. Surely a common thought is that the
expenditures are primarily driven by extensive appeal and postsentencing proceedings. Many may think that streamlining the postsentencing proceedings will reduce the taxpayers' burden. It is here
that defenders can be especially useful by explaining why the death
108. Id.
109. Id. at 14. See also AM. BAR ASS'N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH
PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT xii (2006) ("[T]he cost of a

capital case resulting in a death sentence far exceeds the cost of a case resulting in a life sentence.").
110. DIETER, supra note 101, at 14.
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penalty costs so much. The primary generators of excess expenses
are the trials, not the post-sentencing proceedings. A North Carolina
study found, for example, that the trials cost four times as much as
the appeals process.'' Stripping away appellate and post-conviction
rights and remedies will have little overall effect on death penalty
costs because the trial expenses will remain.
Defenders should explain the many reasons why a death penalty
trial is so much more costly than a non-death penalty proceeding for
the same crime. Jury selection will take much longer in the capital
case. "Each person's position on the death penalty is explored in
detail by the judge, the prosecutor and the defense attorney. Such
questioning about the eventual punishment of the defendant would
not be allowed in a non-death penalty case, and it makes jury
selection take much longer in capital cases." 1 2 More potential jurors
will be needed for the capital case because every juror must be "death
qualified," and many will not be. "Potential jurors must be carefully
questioned about their willingness to vote for the death penalty or life
imprisonment; any prospective juror who cannot fairly consider both
sentencing alternatives is excluded from serving."
The guilt phase in a capital murder trial after the jury is selected
should not raise different issues from the non-capital case, and we
can hope that the lawyers prepare and try each meticulously. The
death penalty attorneys, however, have to make special preparations
for a possible sentencing phase. If the defendant is found guilty, an
additional, separate trial has to be held for the jury to pronounce
whether the defendant should be executed, and this proceeding is
very expensive.
The attorneys must seek information about possible mitigating and
aggravating factors that might be presented to the jury. Mitigating
factors can come from any part of a defendant's life, and, therefore,
every part of the defendant's existence from birth to the present must
be probed. As a result, it is common for at least two prosecutors and

I 11.
112.

See id. at 18.
Id. at 21.

113. Id.
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two defense attorneys to be assigned to the case so that attorneys can
fully explore. and prepare for the guilt and penalty phase. And in
addition, a well-defended case usually requires the assistance of an
expert in mitigation in addition to the attorneys.
The mitigation phase inevitably leads to the presentation of
evidence that was not admissible during the guilt phase. The defense,
for example, may contend that the defendant was abused as a child
and that this abuse is a mitigating factor. Evidence for this
contention, which may have occurred decades earlier, may take great
effort to unearth. If the defense presents such evidence, the
prosecution, of course, can contest it, and the prosecution has to
spend comparable efforts in exploring the issue. Even if an insanity
defense was not presented at trial, mental illness at any point in the
defendant's life might be presented as mitigation. This can require
the presentation of psychiatric and psychological experts by both
sides who were not presented at the guilt phase. The defense may
claim mitigation because of a defendant's military service, and both
sides will have to probe military records. The possibilities for
mitigation are legion and can take much work to develop.
The prosecution can present evidence about aggravating factors
that was not presented at the guilt phase. The prosecution may
contend that death is warranted because of other depredations
committed by the defendant. The defense in response may contest the
prosecution's depictions, and that, in essence, can lead to separate
mini-trials. In some states, the prosecution may present evidence of
the future dangerousness of the defendant, and this can bring another
round of psychiatric and psychological evidence requiring more
experts, who must be paid not only for their court time but also for
their preparation. And if the defendant is mentally retarded, he cannot
be executed without another round of experts and ensuing costs.
In effect, a complete biography of the defendant needs to be
prepared by both the prosecution and defense, and the biographical
compilation takes much time and money. Relatives, teachers, coworkers, supervisors, friends, acquaintances, doctors, and others who
have encountered the defendant from all parts of his life need to be
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found and interviewed and, if they have useful information for the
penalty phase, prepared for trial and brought to court. Since the
penalty-phase evidence is presented to the same jury that decided
guilt, the penalty phase is usually held shortly after the verdict on
guilt is announced. This means that the work on the penalty phase
has to be done before the guilt phase, and it has to be done even if the
work turns out not to be necessary because the jury returns a notguilty verdict to all death penalty counts.
Defenders should point out to fiscal conservatives that the costs of
a capital trial can be especially devastating to a locality. In many
places, the trial process is funded primarily by the local community,
not the state. "An article in the Wall Street Journal noted that in
states where counties are chiefly responsible for prosecuting capital
cases, the expenses can put an extraordinary burden on local budgets
comparable to that caused by a natural disaster."ll 4
While capital trials are enormously expensive, the death penalty
increases budgets in ways other than through litigation. For example,
those held under a sentence of death are generally imprisoned
separately from the general prison population with increased security,
and this costs extra:
In California, a legislative commission concluded that it
costs the state an extra $90,000 for each death row inmate
per year compared to the costs of the same inmate housed
in general population. With over 670 inmates on death row,
that amounts to an additional yearly cost of $60 million

114. Id. at 19. John Grisham makes a similar point in one of his novels when a lawyer who had
defended death penalty cases states:
Only a rich person can afford to pay a lawyer for a capital defense, and there are no rich
people on death row. . . . The people want the death penalty-something like 70 percent
in this state-yet they have no idea how they're paying for it.
From start to finish, the case cost Mingo County $3 million. They were forced to raise
property taxes several times, and this led to an uprising. There were drastic budget cuts in
schools, road maintenance, and health services. They closed their only library. The
county was near bankruptcy for years. And all of it could have been prevented if the
prosecutor had allowed the boys to plead guilty and take life without parole.
JOHN GRISHAM, THE CONFESSION 108-10 (Dell Mass Market Ed. 2011) (2010).
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solely attributable to the death penalty."' 5
When all the expenses are calculated, each death penalty
proceeding imposes a huge burden on taxpayers. A 2000 estimate
concluded that Florida spends $54 million a year over what it would
spend to punish all first-degree murderers with life in prison without

parole."16
Fiscal conservatives should see that the death penalty does not
demonstrably benefit societal safety. On the other hand, the death
penalty greatly burdens taxpayers. The result of such a cost-benefit
analysis is clear. Defenders should be presenting this information to
fiscal conservatives seeking to get them to join in the movement for
abolishing the death penalty.
CONCLUSION

Our present economic crisis will harm those who defend indigents.
The chronic underfunding of public defenders can only be expected
to get worse. On the other hand, that economic crisis provides an
opportunity for meaningful criminal justice reform. Fiscal
conservatives have realized that many tough-on-crime policies have
not aided public safety, but have increased taxpayers' burdens. Such
conservatives are proposing some sensible reforms. Defenders should
recognize that fiscal conservatives may be the most likely to get such
changes enacted. Defenders should seek to aid the fiscal
conservatives on proposals those conservatives have made.
Defenders, however, should use their experience to identify other
reforms that the fiscal conservatives have not recognized,
concentrating on areas of criminal justice that do not enhance societal
safety while increasing the taxes that have to be paid.

115.

DIETER, supra note 101, at 21.
116. Id. at 15.

